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This paper shows that, unlike what has been found in other papers, a hydro reservoir
is an eﬀe c t i v et o o lt oe x e r c i s em a r k e tp o w e r .I t sa p p e a l i n ga sat o o li se n h a n c e db yt h e
fact that there is no need to constrain total hydro production - a practice too easy to
detect -; it suﬃces to distort the intertemporal allocation of hydro production over time.
A hydro-producer may increase his proﬁts by exploiting diﬀerences in price elasticity
of demand across periods, allocating too little supply to less elastic periods and too
much to more elastic periods. Diﬀerences in price elasticity across periods may result
from the combination of a ﬂuctuating market demand and capacity or transmission
constraints that bind intermitently. This hydro scheduling decision is only available to
hydro producers as thermal generators are not able to "store electric power" and decide
when to sell it. It is also shown that total hydro production is not a suﬃcient indicator
of market power being exercised as hydro producers may exercise market power even
when all the water available in the\reservoir is used. The real indicator of market power
being exercised is the hydro scheduling strategy used
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper shows that, unlike what has been argued in the literature, hydro producers may
be able to exercise market power in hydro and mixed hydro/thermal electric systems. Even
though hydro producers may attempt to drive prices up by constraining total production-
a practice too easy to detect -, they may also use a tool that is not available to thermal
producers: the scheduling of their hydro-storage plants’ production. Hydro producers may
increase their proﬁts by exploiting diﬀerences in price elasticity of demand across periods:
they allocate too little supply to low price elasticity periods and too much to high elasticity
periods, relative to the allocation that would result in a perfectly competitive market. Since
this strategy may be used, and be successful, even when all the available hydro ﬂows in the
reservoir are used, this paper calls to shift the focus of the analysis of market power in hydro
and mixed hydro/thermal power systems from total production to the scheduling of the hydro
reservoir plants.
In the past years empirical papers that study market power issues in the power industry
have boomed, especially those that attempt to diagnose market power, either ex-ante or ex-
post a deregulation process has actually taken place. This behavior has been motivated by
the power industry de-regulation wave that has spread throughout the world with diﬀerent
degree of success (UK, many states in the US, Argentina, Colombia, Australia, New Zealand
and so on) and most likely by recent experiences regarding the exercise of market power
(being California the most notable example).
The analysis of market power in the literature has mostly focused on thermal (or predom-
inantly thermal) systems. This literature seems to agree on the conclusion that more market
power can be exercised when the fringe’s capacity is exhausted (which usually occurs when
demand is high) because this makes the residual demand curve faced by the ﬁrms with market
power less elastic. The exercise of market power results in high prices and in an ineﬃcient
allocation (production costs are not minimized). Results are very sensitive to the elasticity
of demand as well as the elasticity of fringe supply. For more details see Green and Newbery
(1992), Von der Fehr and Harbord (1993), Andersson and Bergman (1995), Borenstein et al
(1996), Wolak and Patrick (1997), Wolfram (1998, 1999), Borenstein and Bushnell (1999),
Borenstein et al (2002) and Joskow and Kahn (2002).
Less attention has been given to market power issues in purely hydro or mixed hydro-
thermal systems. This omission is probably explained by the presumption that market power
cannot be exercised in purely hydro systems because all the water available must be used and,
the argument goes, a producer would not beneﬁt from constraining its production in certain
hours as this would lower the value of water in future periods (Halseth 1998). However,
this presumption is incorrect. As this paper shows, even if the producer is forced to use
all the hydro resources that are available in a certain period (say, a month), the producer
may still have enough ﬂexibility to decide when to use them (i.e. what speciﬁch o u r sw i t h i n
the month). In that case, the producer will choose to allocate its hydro production so as to
maximize its inter-temporal proﬁts.
The hydro scheduling issue, probably the most important tool hydro producers have to
exercise market power, has not received enough a t t e n t i o ni nt h el i t e r a t u r e .E v e np a p e r st h a t
explicitly study market power issues in hydro or mixed hydro/thermal electric systems do not
analyze how are hydro resources inter-temporally allocated, but focused almost exclusively
on total output and / or total hydro generation (Halseth, 1998; Scott, 1998). Most noticeable
2exceptions are Bushnell (1998) and Johnsen et al (1999).
This paper shows that a necessary condition for the exercise of market power in mixed
thermal-hydro or purely hydro systems is the existence of diﬀerences in price-elasticity across
periods. If that is the case, then producers schedule their hydro production in order to exploit
those diﬀerences allocating too little supply to low price - elasticity periods and too much to
high price-elasticity periods, relative to the competitive equilibrium. The exercise of market
power results by a hydro producer results in price diﬀerences across periods being enlarged
rather than reduced. This hydro scheduling strategy may be observed no matter how long
is the planning horizon assumed in the model (a month, a year); the only ”requirement” is
that diﬀerences in price-elasticity of demand are large enough. The smaller the ﬂuctuation,
the closer is the hydro scheduling strategy to the conclusions of the traditional competitive
supply-demand or value-maximizing optimization analysis (i.e. water is stored when it is
relatively abundant and released when it is relatively scarce). According to this result, the
role of price elasticity of demand in the degree of market power that can be exercised in a
purely hydro or mixed hydro-thermal systems is not only given by its level, as traditional
models of market power point out (”the less elastic is demand, the more market power can
be exercised, ceteris paribus”) but also by its variability across periods.
Since diﬀerences in price elasticity are key to the exercise of market power, it is important
to learn where do these diﬀerences come from. In the more common setting, a hydro producer
faces a residual demand that results from rivals’ supply deducted from market demand.
As long as market demand is ﬂuctuating (there are peak and oﬀ peak periods) and that
rivals’ capacity constraints are intermittently binding, diﬀerences in price elasticity of residual
demand across periods should result. In a previous paper, Johnsen et al (1999) showed
that market power can only be exercised in hydro systems when there is congestion in the
transmission system. They showed that hydro producers may have incentives to withhold
capacity when transmission constraints bind because they can later use the remaining water
when there are no constraints and the market is less concentrated. My paper shows that
their result is just a particular case of the more general result which is the importance of
diﬀerences in price elasticity in the degree of market power that can be exercised. Indeed,
a transmission constraint can be re-interpreted as a rival’s capacity constraint because when
the line is congested, rivals’ located at the other side of the line cannot react to price increases
in the local market by increasing their production and their sales to that market.
To illustrate the main results I use a monopoly model of a power industry whose portfolio
of generation is made up only by hydro-reservoir plants. The analysis is later extended to
a duopolistic industry with a mixed hydro/thermal portfolio of generation. In both cases
particular care is given to the hydro scheduling decision. A simulation of the market equilib-
rium (and producers’ strategies) assuming competitive and Cournot equilibrium was carried
out using real demand and cost data from Chile’s electricity industry (year 2000). Analyzing
Chile’s power sector is especially interesting because a large fraction of its generating capac-
ity is stored hydro (47%) and its generation segment is highly concentrated. Since capacity
constraints are expected to be important, no eﬀort was made to linearize or smooth each
producer’s marginal cost function. Solving the model with a step-wise marginal cost function
imposes some costs (especially in terms of the uniqueness of equilibrium) but the beneﬁts of
this modeling choice are greater
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section I use a simple two period model
to analyze the incentives a monopolistic hydro producer faces to drive market prices up and
3the way he may use his hydro reservoir to do that. The model is extended in Section 3 to a
duopolistic industry with a mixed hydro/thermal generating portfolio. In the same section,
the data used to run a simulation of the model is described and the results are reported. The
ﬁnal Section concludes and gives direction for further research
2 The Model
The whole idea behind the exercise of market power is to reduce output in order to increase
market price. However, the available set of strategies that can be used by producers to exercise
market power diﬀer between purely thermal and purely hydro or mixed hydro/thermal electric
systems. In a purely thermal system, the only decision that can be taken is when to switch
on or oﬀ a plant and how much to produce at every moment in time. On the other hand, a
system with hydro-reservoirs allows producers to store water during some periods and release
it in some others; in other words, they are able to ”store” power and release it to the market
at their convenience. Therefore, hydro producers are entitled to decide not only when to
switch on or oﬀ their plants and how much to produce, but also to decide when they want to
use their hydro resources over a certain period of time, subject to minimum and maximum
hydro ﬂow constraints. Having hydro resources as a source of electric generation means that
ﬁrms do not take static production decisions at each moment in time, but that ﬁrms have to
take into account that more water used today means that less water is available for tomorrow.
Accordingly, a hydro producer might use two diﬀerent tools to exercise market power: the
level of its total production and/or the scheduling of its hydro plants. The latter is a more
subtle strategy since constraining total hydro production in order to force market prices up
is a strategy easier to observe and thus easier to be alleged as anti-competitive. Since it
is the ”storing of water” feature associated to a reservoir what entitles a hydro producer to
schedule his/her hydro plants, this dynamic scheduling decision is not available to hydro-ROR
nor thermal producers.
In this section I use a simple two period model to analyze the incentives a hydro producer
faces to drive market prices up and the way he may use his hydro reservoir to do that. 1 I
assume that market demand (Qt(pt)) is faced by a unique generator and that its generating
portfolio is made up by a hydro-reservoir complex. I further assume that all the water inﬂows
are received at the beginning of period 1 and that the hydro producer is forced to have used
all the water that is available at the end of the second period. The latter assumption is not
strictly required but is helpful because it means that the monopolist cannot use total hydro
production to exercise market power, leaving only the hydro scheduling strategy available. In
this way, the analysis is focused on the use of a tool that is only available to hydro producers;
no attention will be given to a tool whose use to exercise market power is common knowledge.
The Monopolist maximizes his inter-temporal proﬁts (equation 1) subject to a hydro
resources availability constraint (equation 2) as shown by the following optimization problem:
max
q1,q2
{P1(q1)q1 + P2(q2)q2} (1)
subject to q1 + q2 = qTot (2)
1Hereafter ”hydro producer” will refer to a producer who owns a hydro-reservoir.
4where Pt(qt) is the inverse of market demand, qt is hydro-production in period t and qTot
is the energy equivalent of the total water inﬂows that are available to be used in periods
1a n d22. Market demands in each period are assumed to be independent. Except for
the hydro resources availability constraint, this could be thought of as a third degree price
discrimination model. Indeed we will see that the results are very similar.








− σ =0 (4)
q1 + q2 = qTot (5)
where σ is the Lagrange Multiplier for the available hydro ﬂows constraint. Notice that
this multiplier is constant over time and indicates the marginal value of water (MVW), i.e.
how much would proﬁts increase if an additional unit of water (measured in energy units)
were available. The MVW may also be interpreted as the marginal cost of water: how much
would the monopolist be willing to pay for an extra unit of water.
Equations 3 and 4 may be written in terms of the marginal revenue the hydro producer
gets in each period (MRt)a s :
MR1 = σ (6)
MR2 = σ (7)
According to equations 6 and 7 the monopolist produces in each period until the marginal
revenue is equal to the marginal value of water. Since the MVW is constant over time
Proposition 1 can be formulated as:
Proposition 1 The Monopolist schedules the production of his hydro plants in order to equal-
ize Marginal Revenue over time (equation 8)
MR1 = MR2 = σ (8)
The intuition of this is the following: if the producer uses an additional unit of water to
generate power today, proﬁts increase by MR1.A tt h es a m et i m e ,t h e r ei so n eu n i tl e s so f
w a t e rt ob eu s e di nt h en e x tp e r i o da n dt h u sp r o ﬁts are reduced by MR2.I no t h e rw o r d s ,
the marginal cost of producing an additional unit in period 1 is given by MR2. Accordingly
in equilibrium, the hydro plant should be scheduled to produce in each period such that
marginal revenue is equalized over time.3. This result is similar to what we would have found
2Additionally a minimum and maximum hydro capacity constraint may be included. The ommission does
not change the cualitative conclusions.
3If minimum and maximum hydro capacity constraints were included and any of them were binding,
marginal revenue would be equalized over time except for a gap given by the shadow price of the binding
constraint.
5in a third degree price discrimination model; the only diﬀerence is that the hydro resources
availability constraint restricts the total amount of production (electric power in this case)
that can be sold in both markets.
This strategy is diﬀerent from what a competitive producer would do.
Proposition 2 A producer with no market power (
∂Pt(qt)
∂qt =0 ) schedules the production of
his hydro plants in order to equalize prices over time.
P1(q1)=P2(q2)=σ (9)
Notice that no matter how competitive is the industry, the hydro producer always sched-
ules his hydro plants in order to equalize the marginal proﬁt that he earns from one more
unit of production over the whole period in which the hydro plant is being used. Accordingly,
a producer with no market power shaves demand in order to equalize prices while a producer
with market power equalizes marginal revenues over time. In other words, a hydro producer
who is able to exercise market power peak shaves marginal revenues rather than prices.
In order to illustrate more precisely the scheduling of hydro production over time I solve
the model for a CES market demand given by Qt(Pt)=ktP
−εt
t where kt is a demand para-
meter and εt is the price elasticity of demand (deﬁned as a positive number) .Accordingly,














Example 3 Constant demands + constant elasticity over time (ε1 = ε2 and k1 = k2)
When demand and price elasticity do not ﬂuctuate over time, the competitive producers’
and the monopolist’s hydro scheduling strategy coincide (P1(q1)=P2(q2) ). Accordingly in
both cases prices are equalized over periods and no market power can be exercised.
Example 4 Fluctuating demands + constant elasticity over time (ε1 = ε2 and k1 >k 2)
Unlike Example 3, q1 >q 2, but it is still true that both the monopolist and the competitive
producer schedule their hydro plants in order to equalize prices over time. In other words,
the competitive equilibrium and the monopoly equilibrium coincide. Market power cannot be
exercised in a hydro system if elasticity is constant over time even when demand ﬂuctuates
over time. It is still left to know what happens when there are diﬀerences in demand elasticity.
Example 5 Constant demands + diﬀerent elasticity over time (ε1 >ε 2 and k1 = k2)
It can be shown that when there are diﬀerences in demand elasticity over time the hydro
scheduling strategy used by a competitive producer is diﬀe r e n tf r o mt h eo n eu s e db yam o -
nopolist. As Equation 11 shows, the monopolist allocates relatively less supply to the less










¶P erf ect Competition
(11)
6It can also be shown that the larger the diﬀerence in price-elasticity across periods (ε1−ε2),
the larger is the distortion -in terms of price and hydro production per period) that results
from the monopolist’s behavior.
A hydro reservoir allows the producer to shift production from one period to another.
When choosing the hydro scheduling strategy the producer realizes that by constraining
hydro production in one period, more water will be left available for the other period. If
price elasticity is constant over time, the monopolist does not gain anything by distorting
the hydro production schedule because the extra revenue that he may earn by constraining
production in one period is more than compensated by the lower revenue in the other period,
resulting in smaller total proﬁts. On the contrary, when there are diﬀerences in demand
elasticity, the monopolist is able to increase his proﬁts by shifting production from the less
elastic period to the more elastic period. It is no longer true that prices are equalized over
time.
This simple model clearly illustrates the mechanic that lies behind the exercise of market
power by a hydro producer. Three lessons can be learnt from it:
Proposition 6 A necessary condition for the exercise of market power in a purely hydro
system is the existence of diﬀerences in price-elasticity across periods.
The model shows that the traditional belief that ”no market power can be exercised in
hydro systems” proves to be true only in cases in which price elasticity of demand is constant
over time. Indeed, ﬂuctuating demands does not provide suﬃcient incentive for a monopolist
to exercise market power. The smaller is the diﬀerence in price-elasticity of demand across
periods, the closer is the hydro scheduling strategy used to the one that would be observed
if the market were competitive.
Proposition 7 A hydro-monopolist exercises market power by exploiting diﬀerences in price-
elasticity across periods. The monopolist allocates too little supply to the less elastic period
and too much to the more elastic periods.
A hydro reservoir allows the producer to shift hydro production from one period to an-
other. If the reservoir is managed competitively, more would be allocated to periods of high
demand and prices would end up being the same over time 4 However if the reservoir is man-
aged by a monopolist, there would be a completely diﬀerent result. By allocating relatively
less to less elastic periods and relatively more to more elastic periods, price diﬀerences would
be enlarged. This is summarized by Proposition 8.
Proposition 8 The exercise of market power by a hydro producer results in price diﬀerences
across periods being enlarged rather than reduced.
Since price-elasticity of demand must be diﬀerent across periods for market power to be
exercised in a hydro system , it is important to understand where these diﬀerences may come
from. Fluctuating demands may be one possible explanation, but it depends on the functional
form of demand as Example 4 shows. In a more general setting, we could argue that the hydro
producer usually faces a residual demand given by the diﬀerence between market demand and
4Prices would be the same except for shadow prices in case any capacity constraint is binding.
7rivals’ supply. As long as market demand is ﬂuctuating (there are peak and oﬀ-peak periods)
and that rivals’ maximum capacity is constant (i.e. capacity constraints are intermittently
binding) we should expect to observe diﬀerences in price-elasticity across time. If this is the
case and if conditions are favorable, market power may be exercised.
In order to analyze these issues in the next section the model used will be extended in
diﬀerent ways and simulations of the market equilibrium will be estimated for Chile’s electric-
ity industry. The power industry will be modeled as a Cournot duopoly with a competitive
fringe (as opposed to the monopoly model used in this section). In addition producers’
thermal capacity constraint will play a central role in the results.
3 A Cournot duopoly model for a hydro/thermal power
industry
The analysis in the previous section is extended to a duopolistic industry with a mixed
hydro/thermal generating portfolio. Later a simulation exercise of the market equilibrium
and producers’ strategies is carried out using real demand and cost data from Chile’s largest
electricity system -the Interconnected Central System, SIC- for April 2000.
Analyzing Chile’s power sector is especially interesting because a large fraction of its
generating capacity is stored hydro and its generation segment is highly concentrated. The
Hirschmann - Herﬁndahl index is 3716. Two economic groups (Endesa and Gener) control
76% of total installed capacity and 71% of total generation. As it is shown in Table 1 and
Figure 1, these ﬁrms diﬀer in size, composition of their generating portfolio and associated
marginal cost functions. Endesa owns a mixed hydro/thermal portfolio, concentrates 78% of
the system’s hydro reservoir capacity and its thermal capacity covers a wide range of fuel and
eﬃciency levels. Gener is basically a purely thermal producer and concentrates the largest
fraction of thermal resources of the industry. . In order to simplify the reading of the paper,
I will refer to these companies as ”Firm 1” (Endesa) and ”Firm 2” (Gener).
3.1 The Model
Following Borenstein and Bushnell (1999) and Bushnell (1998) the industry is modeled as
a Cournot duopoly (Firms 1 and 2) with a competitive Fringe.Both producers own thermal
plants but only Firm 1 and the Fringe own hydro-reservoir plants. Therefore Firm 1’s portfolio
is a combination of hydro and thermal plants while Firm 2 is a purely thermal producer. Firm
1 and Firm 2’s portfolios are made up only by those plants that may be used strategically.5
I assume that producers maximize inter-temporal proﬁts over a month with 6 sub-periods of
equal length (denoted by t). 6




{Pt(qt)(H1t + T1t) − CT1(T1t)} (12)
5Must Run plants are excluded from Cournot producers’ portfolio.
6The larger the number of subperiods, the more ﬂuctuation in demand across periods is allowed but the
more complicated is the model to solve.
8subject to
T MIN
1 ≤ T1t ≤ T MAX
1t ∀t (thermal production min/max constraints) (13)
H MIN
1 ≤ H1t ≤ H MAX
1 ∀t (hydro production min/max constraints) (14)
6 X
t
H1t ≤ H TOT
1 (hydro resources availability) (15)




{Pt(qt)(T2t) − CT2(T2t)} (16)
subject to
T MIN
2 ≤ T2t ≤ T MAX
2 ∀t (thermal production min/max constraints) (17)
where: Pt(qt) is the inverse function of the residual demand faced by each Cournot producer
in period t and qt is total production by ﬁrms 1 and 2 in period t. Thermal and hydro
production by ﬁrm i are denoted as Ti and Hi respectively (since Firm 2 doesn’t own hydro
plants H2 =0 )CTi(Tit) denotes Firm i’s total cost function. Minimum and maximum
capacity constraints are denoted by a superscript MIN / MAX respectively while total
hydro inﬂows available (in energy-equivalent units) is given by H TOT
1 .
T h em o d e li sm o s t l yt h es a m et h a nt h eo n ep r e s e n t e di nt h ep r e v i o u ss e c t i o ne x c e p tf o r
the Cournot setting and the mixed generating portfolio. In addition, minimum and maximum
capacity constraints (equations 13, 14 and 17) were explicitly included this time.




{Pt(qt)(H1t + T1t) − CT1(T1t) − λ1t(T1t − T MAX
1t ) (18)
−α1t(T MIN
1 − T1t) − γ1t(H1ht − H MAX
1 ) − δ1t(H MIN
1 − H1t)} − σ1(
X
t
H1t − H TOT
1 )





{Pt(qt)(T2t) − CT2(T2t) − λ2t(T2t − T MAX
2 ) − α2t(T MIN
2 − T2t)} (19)
Where λit and αit,are the Lagrange multipliers for maximum and minimum thermal capacity
constraints, γ1t and δ1t for maximum and minimum hydro capacity and σ1 is the multiplier
for the available hydro ﬂows constraint. They all must be positive. It is important to keep
in mind that σ1 is the only multiplier that is constant over time. As in the model of the
previous section, it indicates the marginal value of water, i.e. the additional proﬁtF i r m1
would get if an additional unit of water became available.
FOC for Firms 1 and 2 written in terms of Marginal Revenue (MRi )a n dM a r g i n a lC o s t
(ci)a r e : 7
7Slackness conditions are not reported.
9MR1t = c1 + λ1t − α1t (20)
MR1t = σ1 + γ1t − δ1t (21)
MR2t = c2 + λ2t − α2t (22)
As a result, each period both ﬁrms schedule their production in order to equalize marginal
revenue to marginal cost (thermal and/or hydro), adjusted for shadow prices (constraints 20,
21 and 22). In addition, Firm 1 allocates water across time so as to equalize the adjusted
marginal cost of water (denoted by Ω1t = σ1+γ1t −δ1t) with the marginal cost of producing
an additional unit of power from the marginal thermal plant (constraints 20 and 21). In
other words, an extra unit of water will be used to generate power until its cost is equal to
the cost of the most expensive thermal plant in use.8 The latter result deﬁnes Firm 1’s hydro
scheduling strategy and mirrors Proposition 8 for a mixed hydro/thermal power system. The
intuition for this result is the following: an additional unit of water would replace production
from the least eﬃcient thermal plant that is in use and proﬁts would increase by the cost of
production that has been saved. If minimum and maximum capacity constraints were not
binding (γ1t = δ1t = λ1t = α1t =0 ) , then marginal cost and marginal revenue would be
constant as the marginal value of water (σ1) is constant over time. Firm 1 would allocate
hydro storage resources in order to equalize marginal revenue across periods. Firm 1 peak
shaves marginal revenues rather than prices. If any of the capacity constraints were binding,
then these conclusions would still hold but applied to a broader deﬁnition of marginal cost
and or marginal value of water that includes the shadow price of the capacity constraint that
is binding.
The Fringe solves exactly the same optimization problem solved by Firm 1; the only
diﬀerence is that the Fringe does not have any market power, and thus behaves as a price
taker. As a consequence, the fringe uses its plants (thermal and hydro) until the marginal
cost (thermal or hydro plants) is equal to the market price (Equations 23 and 24):
P = cF + λFt− αFt (23)
P = σF + γFt− δFt (24)
Firm 1 and the Fringe’s FOC illustrate how diﬀerent are the hydro scheduling strategies
used by a hydro producer who has and has not market power: while the former peak shaves
marginal revenue over time, the latter peak shaves prices. In addition the presence of thermal
plants does not change the hydro scheduling strategy used. The only new ingredient intro-
duced by thermal plants is that marginal revenue must also be equal to thermal marginal
cost.
Some ﬁnal remarks regarding the models used in this and the previous section to analyze
the exercise of market power are in order. First of all, and as the reader has probably
noticed, these are completely deterministic models. In particular, hydrological resources,
marginal costs and load levels are assumed to be known in advance by the agents. Certainty
with respect to thermal marginal cost functions and demand ﬂuctuations should not be a
8Notice that Firm 1 allocates its plants (thermal and hydro) eﬃciently given the total level of production
(which is ineﬃcient as the ﬁrm produces until marginal cost = marginal revenue < price).
10real concern, as the former are well known in the electricity industry and the shape of the
load curve has been relatively stable in the past years. Certainty with respect to hydrological
inﬂows is clearly a more arbitrary assumption. The longer the planning horizon, the more
uncertain are the hydro inﬂows, and the more important it is to incorporate uncertainty into
the model. In the context of my model, this should not be too problematic either because I
assumed that producers maximize over a short time horizon (one month). Notwithstanding
that, it would be interesting to learn the impact of hydrological uncertainty in the incentives
to exercise market power. Secondly, the models lack dynamic competition elements. This
omission is clearly important for this particular industry as in the context of a power exchange
system, the producers interact on a very frequent basis providing optimal conditions to engage
in (tacit) collusive practices. For instance, producers can easily learn their competitors’
strategies, monitor their behavior and credibly threat in case of deviating from the ”collusive”
strategy. In this sense, the results of the model should be seen as a lower bound of market
power. On the other hand, the model does not incorporate the eﬀect of high prices on potential
entry or in consumption patterns; accordingly market power might be overestimated. Finally,
transmission constraints and contracts were not taken into account. 9
3.2 Data
The model was estimated using real demand and cost data from Chile’s largest electric system,
the SIC, for April 200010.To simplify notation, the subindex t will be dropped except when
its omission may lead to mistakes.
3.2.1 Marginal Cost Functions
Each ﬁrm’s marginal cost function corresponds to the aggregation of their thermal plants’
marginal cost functions. It is assumed that each plant has a constant marginal cost up to
its expected capacity level and was calculated as the monthly average of the weekly marginal
cost reported by the CDEC (Load and Economic Dispatch Center).11 Since market behavior
is modeled as if all transactions took place at the same geographic node, each plant’s marginal
cost was adjusted to take account of marginal energy and power losses using the penalty factor
(reported by the regulator’s oﬃce called Comisión Nacional de Energía, CNE). In addition
each plant’s capacity was adjusted for transmission losses, auto-consumption and average
availability using the corresponding 1995-2000 average factor.12 13. Finally a semi linear
approximation of the Fringe’s supply function is used, in order to minimize the number of
steps of the residual demand faced by Cournot producers. Resulting marginal cost functions
are plotted in Figure 1. Notice that both Firms own low and high marginal cost plants, being
this feature more accentuated in the case of Firm 1
9For an analysis of the eﬀect of transmission constraints and forward contracting see Arellano (2003).
10April has historically been the month in which the annual peak takes place.
11Start-up costs were not taken into account.
12As it was discussed in Borenstein et al (2000) the use of average availability may underestimate true
expected capacity.
13Availability ﬁgures are high for international standards. This may be due to the way they are calculated:
a plant is considered to be available if it doesn’t go down when it is dispatched. However plants that are not
dispatched but are available are also considered being available. The issue here is that there is no certainty
that those apparently available, non-dispatched plants would be eﬀectively available if dispatched. In addition,
availability data seems to include maintenance periods, which is a strategic variable.
113.2.2 Hydro data
Firm 1 and the Fringe’s individual hydro reservoirs were aggregated into only one for each of
them. Minimum hydro production per hour (H MIN
1 ) is given by technical requirements and
by irrigation contracts while maximum hydro production per hour (H MAX
1 ) is determined
by technical requirements. Total hydro inﬂows available, in energy-equivalent units, (H TOT
1 )
is given by the average total hydro production that would be observed in April in a normal
hydrological year, according to the Energy Matrix provided by the CDEC. As it is reported
in Table 2 April’s available hydro production is 1118.1 GWh. 87% of it is controlled by Firm
1 and the remaining 13% by the Fringe.14 .
3.2.3 Residual Demand
Cournot producers (Firms 1 and 2) face a residual demand (DR(P))g i v e nb y :
DR(P)=D(P) − SF(P) − MR− HF (25)
where D(P) is market demand, SF(P) is the Fringe supply’s function, MR is must-run
units’ generation and HF is the hydro production from reservoirs owned by the Fringe.
Market demand: As it is shown in Figure 2, I constructed a step function representation
of April-2000’s load curve with six discrete load levels, each of which is associated to one of
the six sub-periods t of the model.(t =1for the highest load level and t =6for the lowest load
level; they will be referred to as the ”highest” and ”lowest” demand period, respectively).
Each sub-period’s (quantity, price) anchor point was set equal to the associated average
load and the (regulated) price paid by ﬁnal consumers15. Since there is only one price-
quantity observation for each period, market demand cannot be directly estimated. In order
to parameterize a market demand, a functional form must be assumed. Since results turned
out to be independent of the functional form assumed (see Section 3.4), I report the results
of the simulation assuming that market demand is linear (D(Pt)=At − BPt) because they
illustrate more clearly the diﬀerent hydro scheduling strategies used by a hydro producer with
and with no market power. As a consequence of this assumption, price elasticity increases
as the level of production is reduced and the elasticity of demand at the price where the
market clears is always higher when there is market power.16 Demand parameters A and
B are closely related to the elasticity assumption. Since estimates of the price elasticity of
demand for electricity (ε) vary widely in the literature, I follow the traditional approach of
estimating and reporting the results of the model for several values of elasticity. In particular,
market demand will be estimated for two diﬀerent values of ε = {-1/3, -2/3}, measured at the
14Since the CDEC does not have and estimation for the Laja system (the largest in the country) I used the
observed average generation of that hydro system in April of a normal year.
15The observed load per hour was increased by 13% to take account of spinning reserves.
16Empirical evidence supports the assumption of price elasticity being a function of the output level as the
linear functional form implies. However, evidence is not conclusive regarding whether demand at peak hours
is more or less elastic than at oﬀ peak hours. Aigner et al (1994) estimated that demand for electricity in the
winter was more elastic during peak periods while in the spring/autumn season it was the oﬀ peak demand
the one that was more price responsive.
12anchor point at peak hours. 17 Accordingly, the slope parameter B is calculated such that
the elasticity at the peak demand level was equal to ”ε” and the intercept A is calculated
so as to ﬁt anchor quantity and anchor price at each demand level.18 Table 3 reports the
parameters A and B estimated for market demand when assuming ε = -1/3. Observe that
by assuming that market demand is linear and the slope is constant across load levels, it is
implicitly assumed that market demand at peak hours is less elastic than demand at oﬀ peak
hours (at a constant price).
Must run quantity (MR): ”Must-Run” plants are those that cannot be used strategically
by their owners. They include two small co-generator thermal plants that produce electricity
and steam and all the hydro-ROR plants that are not associated to any reservoir system
upstream. MR was calculated as the average generation per hour in April 2000 for thermal
plants, and in a normal hydro year for the hydro-ROR plants (according to the Energy
Matrix provided by the CDEC). As it is reported in Table 3, column 7, MR is constant over
the entire planning horizon. Since Must Run plants’ production was subtracted from total
demand, Must Run plants were also removed from the set of available generation units and
excluded from marginal cost functions.
Hydro-reservoir generation by the Fringe (HF). According to equation 24, the Fringe
allocates its hydro production from reservoirs to equalize prices over time (adjusted by min-
imum or maximum ﬂow constraints’ shadow prices if any of them were binding). When
market demands are linear, this hydro scheduling strategy consists in allocating as much hy-
dro production as possible (given minimum and maximum ﬂow constraints) to every period
in order to eliminate or reduce demand peaks. Total hydro production from the Fringe was
allocated across periods according to this ”Peak Shaving Approach”. 19 HF used to estimate
the model corresponds to the average hydro generation per hour allocated to each sub-period.
As Table 3, column 8 reports, the small amount of total hydro production to allocate over
the month resulted in the Minimum production constraint being binding almost the entire
period. Figure 3 illustrates that as a result, peaks were only slightly reduced and the shape
of the ”shaved load” curve remained mostly the same.
The shape and position of residual demands faced by Cournot producers is explained by a
combination of four elements: the anchor point, the Fringe’s supply for thermal production,
the load curve shape that results after allocating Fringe’s hydro production through a peak
shaving strategy and rival’s production. Notice that the residual demand faced by both
Cournot producers and given by equation 25 is less elastic in the high demand periods (t =
1,2) than in the low demand periods (t =5 ,6), at a constant price.
17For comparison purposes, I report price elasticity values (”ε”) assumed by other authors in their studies
of market power in the power industry. A constant elasticity of demand was assumed by Borenstein and
Bushnell (1999), estimating the model for ε=-0.1, -0.4 and -1.0 and by Andersson and Bergman (1995) who
used ε=-0.3. A linear demand was assumed by Wolfram (1999) with ε=-0.17 at the mean price and quantity
and by Bushnell (1998) who assumed ε=-0.1 at peak forecasted price/quantity point.
18A similar approach was used by Bushnell (1998).
19For more detail on the peak shaving approach see Borenstein and Bushnell (1999).
133.3 Simulation Results
3.3.1 Competitive equilibrium
As a benchmark case, the Competitive Equilibrium was calculated. Since in a competitive
industry all the hydro producers would schedule their hydro plants attempting to equalize
prices over time, the entire system’s hydro-reservoir production (by the Fringe and Firm 1)
was allocated according to the peak shaving strategy. As Figure 4 illustrates, total hydro
production is so large that its allocation across the month almost completely ﬂattens demand
and peaks are considerably reduced. Results for ε=-1/3 and ε=-2/3 are reported in Table
4. Observe that the equilibrium is exactly the same in the ﬁrst four periods (t=1 to 4) and
almost the same in the ﬁfth one. This is a consequence of total hydro production being so
large that its allocation across the month completely ﬂattens demand in those periods, mostly
eliminating the peaks.
3.3.2 Cournot equilibrium
The Cournot-Fringe model was solved with GAMS/CONOPT using an iterative process. 20
Results are reported in Table 5.
Remark 9 Market power is exercised in Chile’s mixed hydro/thermal power industry.
Comparing Tables 4 and 5, columns 7 and 8, it can be seen that when producers have
market power total output is smaller than in the competitive equilibrium and prices are
considerably higher
Remark 10 The less elastic is demand, the more market power is exercised
Notice in Figure 5 that the diﬀerence between the price charged by Cournot and compet-
itive producers is larger the smaller is the elasticity assumption ε.These results are consistent
with Cournot producers exercising market power especially when demand level is high and
residual demand is less elastic
Remark 11 More market power is exercised when residual demand is less elastic.
Figure 5 clearly illustrates that as the demand level falls, the Cournot equilibrium con-
verges monotonically to the competitive equilibrium. The exception is given by the last period
20Uniqueness of equilibrium was not investigated theoretically but empirically. In particular, the simulation
was solved for 400 randomly chosen starting points. The model always converged to the same aggregated
equilibrium: prices, each ﬁrm’s total production, marginal cost, marginal value of water and proﬁts. The
only exception is given by Firm 1’s production strategy: even though it is true that the equilibrium for Firm
1’s total production is unique, this is not true for its production strategy, i.e. the decision of how much
is produced from its thermal and hydro-storage plants(T1,H 1). Multiplicity of equilibrium is explained by
Firm 1 being able to allocate hydro production over time and by marginal cost being constant over relevant
intervals of output. Indeed, observe that the FOCs are in terms of Marginal Revenue and Marginal Cost
and that the former is a function of total sales and independent of what plants were used. This problem
only aﬀects Firm 1 as it is the only one who is able to allocate hydro production over time and that is able
to combine thermal and hydro plants to produce a certain output level. I want to remark that in spite of
this multiplicity of equilibrium, all the qualitative conclusions hold and magnitudes are very similar. Values
reported in the tables for H1 and T1 are averages calculated over 400 diﬀerent estimations of the model.
14(t=6) when demand is at its lowest level which may be explained by Firm 2 increasingly con-
straining production as demand falls. Industry’s Lerner Indices (not reported) are consistent
with these results; the average markup goes from 64% when demand is a its highest level to
58% in the low demand period21.
Nothing really new has been said until now. Indeed, this information is not enough to
argue that market power is the result of the strategic use of hydro resources. In order to
answer these questions we need to know ﬁrst who is exercising market power.
Remark 12 The hydro producer (Firm 1) exercises market power by distorting the hydro
scheduling strategy.
By comparing Tables 4 and 5 it is clear that when demand is at high (t =1 ,2) and
medium (t =3 ,4) levels, Firm 1 is the one that really enjoys market power. Indeed, Firm 1
has so much market power and is able to drive prices up by so much that Firm 2’s optimal
strategy is to produce at capacity.22 F i r m2i sa b l et op r o ﬁtably constrain its production
and exercise market power only in the last 2 periods, when demand is low (column 4). Firm
2’s large thermal capacity proved not to be enough to enable it to exercise market power.
Behind this result is the fact that a large fraction of its capacity are baseload plants, which
are usually not marginal and thus do not set the market price23.
Firm 1 chooses to satisfy demand mainly through hydro production. In particular, it uses
all the hydro production that is available (
P6
t H1t = H TOT
1 ) but allocates it diﬀerently than
in the competitive model (Column 3).As it is clearly observed in Figure 6, Firm 1 allocates
relatively less water to high demand periods and relatively more water to the low demand
periods. The former coincides with periods in which Firm 2 is capacity constrained while
in the latter is not. This hydro allocation enlarges the diﬀerence between peak and oﬀ-peak
periods, as opposed to what is observed under competition. These results are in line with
Propositions 7 and 8. This eﬀect is smaller the more elastic is demand24.
Two important lessons are worth noting:
Remark 13 Total hydro production over a certain period is not a suﬃcient indicator of the
exercise of market power in electric systems with mixed hydro / thermal portfolios.
Remark 14 The relevant indicator of the exercise of market power by a hydro producer is
the hydro scheduling strategy used.
21F o rm o r ed e t a i l ss e eA r e l l a n o( 2 0 0 3 ) .
22Strictly speaking, Firm 2 is not producing at capacity as it still has some thermal plants that are not
being run. However, the big diﬀerence observed between the marginal cost of Firm 2’s next available plant
and the marginal plant at that demand level (almost $30) prevents Firm 2 from increasing production. By
contrast, Firm 1 has a large capacity at a relatively low marginal cost. See Figure 1.
23Based on Producer and Consumer Surplus analysis, it can be shown that all of the producers (Firms
1 and 2 and the Fringe) are better oﬀ when market power is exercised. An interesting result is that even
though it is Firm 1 the one who exercises market power by constraining production and driving prices up,
the real winner, in relative terms, is Firm 2. The reason behind this result is clear: since Firm 2 is capacity
constrained when demand is high, its production level is very close to the competitive level but the price is
considerable higher. As expected, the less elastic is demand, the better oﬀ producers are and the worse oﬀ
consumers are as more market power can be exercised.
24In this case, Firm 1 also exercises market power in a less observable way, namely the use (or more
strictly speaking the ”no use”) of its thermal capacity. Indeed Firm 1 uses, on average, only 15% of its
thermal capacity. If Firm 1’s thermal portfolio were in a third generator’s portfolio, Firm 1 would be more
constrained in the exercise of its market power (see Arellano 2003 for a detailed analysis of this scenario).
15The important variable is not total hydro production but hydro scheduling. In the case
analyzed, Firm 1 used all the hydro resources that were available but it allocated them across
periods exactly contrary to what a competitive producer would have done. The importance
of the hydro scheduling strategy as an eﬀective tool to exercise market power has not received
much attention in the empirical literature. For instance, Halseth (1998) argues that since
hydro producers used all the hydro ﬂo w st h a tw e r ea v a i l a b l ei nt h ep e r i o di tc o u l db ea r g u e d
that they did not exercise market power. He does not investigate if hydro producers are
using their hydro scheduling strategy to exercise market power even when using all the water
available. 25 Scott (1998) in a somewhat diﬀerent but related analysis, analyzed the impact
of forward contracting on the incentives to exercise market power. He showed that the higher
the level of forward contracting, the higher is hydro generation. Since he did not explicitly
model the hydro scheduling decision, it is impossible to know how a particular ﬁrm allocates
water overtime.26
As it is argued in Proposition 6, the most important element behind the exercise of market
power by a hydro producer is the existence of diﬀerences in price-elasticity of demand across
periods. In the context of this Section’s exercise, these diﬀerences come basically from the
combination of a market demand which ﬂuctuates over time (coexisting high and low demand
periods) and from Firm 2’s capacity constraints (supply constraints) that are intermittently
binding.
These results, in particular Firm 1’s hydro scheduling strategy, extend what has been
found in the literature. In their study of the Norwegian electricity market, Johnsen et al
(1999) argued that ”market power can not be exercised in markets dominated by hydroelec-
tric producers unless there are transmission constraints”. The hydro producer constrains its
production when the transmission constraint is binding. My model’s results show that trans-
mission constraints are not a necessary condition for the exercise of market power by hydro
producers. Capacity constraints (supply constraints) have the same eﬀect. Both constraints
are just the way diﬀerences in price elasticity are materialized. In other words, demand is less
elastic either because a transmission constraint is binding or a supply constraint is binding,
and the strategy used by a hydro producer to exercise market power will be the same no
matter what is behind the diﬀerences in price elasticity. In any case, the hydro producer
will choose to allocate relatively less supply to periods of low price elasticity of demand and
relatively more supply to periods of high price-elasticity of demand (in comparison with the
competitive equilibrium).
Remark 15 There are two sources of ineﬃciencies in the Cournot equilibrium: low output
and ineﬃcient dispatching.
The Cournot equilibrium is not only ineﬃcient because production falls short the com-
petitive equilibrium production level but also because costs of production are not minimized.
In particular, the Fringe is operating plants that are less eﬃcient (higher marginal cost)
than the ones that are being withheld by Firm 1 and hydro production is used to increase
the diﬀerence between peak and oﬀ peak periods. The possibility of ineﬃcient dispatching
was pointed out by Von der Fehr and Harbord (1993), Borenstein et al (2000) and Wolfram
(1998).
25Halseth’s (1998) conclusion of no market power being exercised may be the result not of the composition
of the portfolio but of ﬁrms not being big enough.
26Results are reported plotting total hydro generation against total contracting level.
163.4 Robustness Checks
There are three assumptions with the potential to change the results just reported: the market
demand’s functional form, the elasticity assumption ε and the length of the planning hori-
zon. To check for the robustness of the results the model was re-estimated using alternative
assumptions.
3.4.1 Market demand functional form
Two diﬀerent functional forms were used to estimate the model:
Linear Demand, diﬀerent slope: D(Pt)=At − BtPt The value of the slope parameter
Bt is such that the elasticity at every (quantity, price) anchor point is equal to ε. Results from
this ”diﬀerent slope approach” are slightly more diﬃcult to interpret than the reported ”same
slope approach” because residual demands intersect on a certain (and relevant) price range.
Notwithstanding that, conclusions from both approaches are almost the same; even order of
magnitudes are similar. As Figure 7 shows it is still true that the hydro producer allocates
relatively less supply to the high demand periods and relatively more to the low demand
periods and that this hydro scheduling strategy is closer to the competitive equilibrium the
more elastic is demand.
CES Demand: Qt(Pt)=ktP
−ε
t The model was estimated under two alternative values of
ε.(1/3 ; 2/3) Since I assumed the same price-elasticity for all the six periods, diﬀerences in
price elasticity of the residual demand faced by Cournot producers result from diﬀerent hydro
production from the Fringe (see Table 3, column 8) and from Firm 2’s capacity constraint
binding intermittently. Figure 7 illustrates that for both values of ε, the hydro scheduling
strategy used by the hydro producer to exercise market power exhibits exactly the same
pattern: relatively less supply to the low elasticity periods and and relatively more to the
high elasticity periods. 27
3.4.2 Importance of the Elasticity assumption.
As a consequence of the linear demand assumption used in the model, price elasticity increases
as the level of production is reduced. In addition the elasticity of demand at the price where
the market clears is always higher when there is market power. In order to check for the
importance of the implied assumption regarding elasticity, the model was re-estimated for a
CES demand under the following three diﬀerent ε’s assumption for the high (t=1,2), middle
(t=3,4) and low (t=5,6) demand periods’ value diﬀering across periods.
Case t=1,2 t=3,4 t=5,6
1. 0.5 0.5 0.5
2. 0.4 0.6 0.8
3. 0.8 0.8 0.4
27I estimated the model for lower values of ε but results turned out to be unrealistic (prices too high).
This should be the result of the traditional problem that Cournot models have when demand is a CES and
elasticity is too low. The hydro scheduling strategy still exhibited the same pattern.
17The hydro scheduling strategies associated to these cases - plotted in Figure 8- are consis-
tent with the model’s results: the larger are the diﬀerences in price elasticity across periods,
the more distorted is the allocation of hydro production. To see this notice that with a CES
market demand, the elasticity of residual demand results from the combination of several
elements: the parameter ε, the level of market demand (given by the parameter kt)a n df r o m
rivals’ capacity constraints. In particular, the smaller is ε and the larger is kt,t h el e s se l a s t i c
is residual demand. Accordingly in Case 2, diﬀerences in price elasticity of residual demand
across periods is maximized as in the high demand periods (t=1,2) kt ’s are high and εt\\are
at its lowest level while exactly the opposite occurs in the low demand periods. In Case 3,
both eﬀects on price elasticity of residual demand tend to compensate to each other: in the
high demand periods kt ’s and εt\\ are high while in the low demand periods kt ’s and εt\\are
low. Accordingly, in case 3 diﬀerences in price elasticity of residual demand across periods
are considerably smaller. The distortion introduced by the hydro producer regarding the
allocation of his hydro production is larger the larger are diﬀerences in price elasticity across
periods.
Accordingly, it cannot be argued that the demand assumptions are driving the results.
Even though the use of a linear demand implicitly imposes that peak demand is less elastic
than oﬀ-peak demand (at a constant price), the hydro scheduling strategy - in terms of the
hydro producer exploiting diﬀerences in price elasticity across periods - remain unaltered
when the low demand period is also assumed to have the less price elastic market demand.
3.4.3 Hydro scheduling over a longer planning horizon
The model used in the previous section to analyze the exercise of market power in an electricity
industry with mixed hydro / thermal portfolio of generation assumed that the hydro producer
allocated its hydro production over a one-month planning horizon. 28 It still needs to be
checked if a hydro producer uses the same hydro scheduling strategy to exercise market power
when faced to a longer planning horizon. In particular, would Firm 1 exploit inter-month
diﬀerences in price-elasticity of demand by moving water around? If so, then water should
be stored in those months in which demand is less elastic and released when demand is more
elastic.
Two diﬀerent approaches may be used to investigate Firm 1’s hydro scheduling strategy
over the year: analysis of the marginal value of water (MVW) and a direct estimation of the
model assuming that the planning horizon is longer. Since the data set required to estimate
a comprehensive one-year version of the model is not available, and therefore many arbitrary
assumptions would be needed, I will concentrate on the MVW analysis. Arellano (2003)
estimates a simple one-year version of the model, reaching to the same conclusions of the
MVW analysis.
The basic idea behind the MVW analysis is the following: given that generators allocate
their hydro production to equalize the marginal revenue across periods (subject to capacity
and/or production constraints) and that in equilibrium marginal revenue is equal to the MVW
(equation 21), it is possible to use the latter to determine the hydro scheduling strategy (when
is water stored/ when it is released) that the producer would use over the year . In particular,
28Indeed, the optimization problem solved by Firm 1 in that model, implicitly assumed that the water left
in the reservoir at the end of the period had no value; accordingly, the incentive to use less water than what
is available is reduced as is the market power exercised.
18if hydro production min/max constraints (equation 14) were not binding, the MVW analysis
would conclude that water inﬂows are stored in months in which water is cheap (low MVW)
a n dr e l e a s e di nm o n t h si nw h i c hw a t e ri sm o r ee x p e n s i v e( h i g hM V W ) .I no t h e rw o r d s ,h y d r o
production would be shifted away from low MR months to high MR months.
To analyze the hydro scheduling strategy over a longer planning horizon, I estimated the
MVW for each month of the year using diﬀerent assumptions for inter-month diﬀerences in
price elasticity of demand. Results are reported in Table 6. Exercise (1) and (2) only diﬀer
in how large are inter-month diﬀerences in price elasticity of residual demand.29 To check for
the validity of the proposition outlined in this paper, I use the correlation coeﬃcient between
each month’s average elasticity of residual demand and the associated MVW. If the hydro
producer allocates its hydro production by exploiting inter-month diﬀerences in demand, i.e.
shifting water away from low elasticity months and releasing it in high elasticity months, the
correlation coeﬃcient should be positive, and larger the larger are inter-month diﬀerences
in demand elasticity. As the last row of Table 6 shows, this is precisely what happens. In
both exercises the correlation coeﬃcient is positive, indicating that water is stored in those
months in which price elasticity is low and released in those months in which price elasticity
is high. In addition, this relationship is stronger the larger are inter-month diﬀerences in
inter-month elasticity of residual demand. These results are consistent with the conclusions
of the one-month model regarding how producers schedule their hydro storage plants in order
to exercise market power.
Finally, it is interesting to note that the correlation coeﬃcient between the MVW and the
ratio hydro inﬂows/ net demand (an indicator of availability of water relative to demand) is
-0.93 and -0.22 for exercises (1) and (2) respectively. This suggests that when inter-month
diﬀerences in price elasticity are not large enough, the hydro scheduling strategy is mainly
explained by a traditional supply-demand analysis; storing water when it is relatively more
abundant and releasing it when it is relatively scarce.
Summarizing, the larger are the diﬀerences in inter-month price elasticity of demand, the
greater the incentive to exercise market power by shifting water from one month to another
and the smaller the relationship between the availability of water relative to demand and
the value of water. The larger the inter-month diﬀerence, the closer is the hydro scheduling
strategy to the market power explanation and further from the traditional supply/demand
analysis.
Conclusions of the one-month model described in Section 3 proved to be robust to changes
in the assumptions used. Neither the linear demand assumption, nor the elasticity parameter
nor the length of the planning horizon had any inﬂuence on the results. 30
4C o n c l u s i o n s
The incentives and the ability a hydro producer would have in a purely hydro and in a mixed
hydro/thermal electric system were analyzed in this paper. Using an analytical model and
29To completely isolate the eﬀect of inter-month diﬀerences in price elasticity, both exercises assume that
there are no intra-month diﬀerences. In other words, there are more elastic months and less elastic months
but within in each month, all the subperiods’ demands are equally elastic. Conclusions are the same when
intra-month diﬀerences in price elasticity are also assumed.
30Results are also robust to changes to the anchor point chosen (not reported).
19quantitative simulations of producers’ strategies, it was shown that hydro reservoirs are a
powerful tool to exercise market power by generators.
Unlike thermal resources, a hydro reservoir allows the producer to store water in some
periods and release it in others, implicitly enabling them to shift power across periods. There-
fore, hydro producers are entitled to decide when they want to use their hydro resources over
a certain period of time. As a result, hydro producers may use two sets of strategies to exer-
cise market power: to constrain total production or to distort the inter-temporal allocation
of his hydro resources. This paper shows that hydro producers may increase their proﬁts
by exploiting diﬀerences in price elasticity, allocating too little supply to periods in which
demand is relatively less elastic, and relatively too much to periods with more elastic demand
(with respect to the competitive equilibrium). As a consequence, diﬀerences between peak
and oﬀ peak periods are enlarged rather than reduced (as it would be the case if the market
were competitive).This strategy may be successful even when all the water available in the
reservoir is used.
Accordingly, total hydro production is not a suﬃcient indicator of market power. Atten-
tion should also be paid to the hydro scheduling strategy. This result may seem not to have
practical implications as in practice it will be diﬃcult to argue that a producer is or is not
exercising market power just by looking at his inter-temporal production decisions, as usually
there is no competitive benchmark to compare with. An alternative approach is to look for
the incentives to exercise market power rather to anti-competitive practices themselves. This
leads us to the price elasticity of demand. and to the double role it plays in this regard.
According to this paper’s results, a policy maker should look not only at its level but also to
its variability across periods.
Conditions for the exercise of market power are more favorable the more inelastic is
demand, an expected result. However, since a hydro producer is able to ”shift power” from
one period to another, there is an additional element that must be looked at when diagnosing
market power: the inter-period diﬀerences in price elasticity. In particular, the larger the
diﬀerence of price elasticity of demand across periods, the greater the incentive the hydro
generator 1 has to exercise market power by shifting hydro production from one period to
another and, accordingly, the further the hydro scheduling strategy to the traditional supply-
demand analysis’ conclusions.
There are three elements of the model that should be kept in mind when analyzing its
results. First, the model has no dynamic elements although a power exchange system is
clearly a perfect scenario for repeated competition. Second, even though high margins will
likely attract new entrants to the industry, the role of entry is not taken into account .It is
reasonable to think that both omissions result in my model underestimating market power.
However, they should not have any impact on the strategy used to exercise market power
except for how intense it is used. Finally, the model assumes that the hydro producer knows
with certainty the size of hydro inﬂows and their timetable. Hydrological uncertainty is likely
to have an important eﬀect on the strategy used by producers to exercise market power. For
instance, a hydro producer may choose to store hydro resources as a precautionary strategy
(may need to use them later) and not because of market power related reasons.
This paper calls for further research in two topics, whose importance was already men-
tioned: the eﬀect of hydrological uncertainty on the incentives to use hydro-reservoirs to
exercise market power and to extend the model presented in the paper to take account of
dynamic issues.
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Hydro  Total  % thermal  % hydro  % total 
Endesa (Firm 1)  939  238  2454  2693  3632  25.9%  74.1%  55% 
Gener   (Firm 2)  1212  245  0  245  1457  83.2%  16.8%  22% 
Other 472  403  697  1100  1571  30.0%  70.0%    24% 
Total 2622  886  3151  4037  6660  39.0%  61.0%  100% 
Source: CDEC-SIC 
 




1  (MW)  H
MAX
1  (MW)  H
TOT
1  (GWh month) 
Firm 1  743.7  2436.1  974.9 
Fringe 183.8  489.2  143.2 
 
Table 3: Demand Estimation, April 2000, ε = -1/3 
 






    Market 














1 4749.7  31.1  6332.9  50.9  0.33  394.5  274.6 
2 4329.6  31.1  5912.8  50.9  0.37  394.5  183.8 
3 4091.1  31.1  5674.3  50.9  0.39  394.5  183.8 
4 3643.3  31.1  5226.5  50.9  0.43  394.5  183.8 
5 3270.8  31.1  4854.0  50.9  0.48  394.5  183.8 
6 2988.5  31.1  4571.7  50.9  0.53  394.5  183.8 
 
Table 4: Base Model, Competitive Equilibrium  
Table 4a: ε = -1/3 
t  T1 H 1 T 2 T F  HF  Qt  Price 
1 673.1  2133.1  944.4  420.5  274.6  4839.0  29.4 
2 673.1  1802.6  944.4  420.5  183.8  4418.9  29.4 
3 673.1  1564.1  944.4  420.5  183.8  4180.4  29.4 
4 673.1  1116.3  944.4  420.5  183.8  3732.6  29.4 
5 673.1  764.7  944.4  420.1 183.8  3380.5 28.9 
6 566.2  743.7  944.4  416.6 183.8  3249.3 26.0 
 
Table 4b: ε = -2/3 
t  T1 H 1 T 2 T F  HF  Qt  Price 
1 673.1  2133.1  944.4  421.5  274.6  4840.0  30.2 
2 673.1  1802.6  944.4  421.5  183.8  4419.9  30.2 
3 673.1  1564.1  944.4  421.5  183.8  4181.4  30.2 
4 673.1  1116.3  944.4  421.5  183.8  3733.6  30.2 
5 673.1  764.7  944.4  421.3 183.8  3381.7 30.0 








Table 5: Cournot Equilibrium  
Table 5a: ε = -1/3 














1 133.7  1743.0  944.4 441.2 274.6  3931.3  47.2 
2 140.1  1572.0  944.4 437.5 183.8  3672.3  44.0 
3 120.3  1472.6  944.4 434.9 183.8  3550.4  41.7 
4 122.0  1247.0  944.4 429.9 183.8  3321.5  37.4 
5 127.0  1094.1  867.7 426.6 183.8  3093.6  34.6 
6 131.9  995.1  773.6 424.5 183.8  2903.3  32.8 
# denotes Multiple equilibrium. Values reported are averages over 400 different simulations 
 
Table 5b: ε = -2/3 














1 377.7  1768.1  944.4  429.0  274.6  4188.3  36.6 
2 376.0  1605.2  944.4  427.1  183.8  3930.9  35.0 
3 378.3  1483.6  944.4  425.8  183.8  3810.3  33.9 
4 375.8  1262.2  944.4  423.2  183.8  3583.9  31.7 
5 379.6  1072.2  944.4  421.1  183.8  3395.6  29.9 
6 378.2  932.5  944.4  419.6 183.8  3252.8 28.5 
# denotes Multiple equilibrium. Values reported are averages over 400 different simulations. 
 
 
Table 6: Marginal Value of Water under different price elasticity assumptions. 
 (1)  (2) 








January 10.08  0.49  0.00  0.15 
February  9.33  0.47 17.25 1.36 
March  8.88 0.51 0.00 0.15 
April  11.13 0.48 15.45 0.94 
May  7.85 0.45 7.85 0.45 
June  0.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 
July  1.14 0.49 1.14 0.49 
August  5.32  0.49 11.13 0.73 
September  7.02  0.48 11.13 0.92 
October  0.00  0.40 11.13 0.72 
November  1.08  0.40 16.62 1.00 
December  7.90  0.40 14.02 0.72 
Average  5.81 0.46 8.81 0.68 
St.dev  4.16 0.04 6.83 0.35 
Corr. Coeff   0.27  0.89 
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CES, E=-1/2 CES, E=-2/3
Diff Slope, E=-1/3 Diff Slope, E=-2/3Figure 8 
























CES, E=-1/2 CES (0.4/0.6/0.8) CES (0.8/0.6/0.4)
 
 